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SAMANTAR, OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
by 
Peter B. Rutledge∗ 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar is most easily understood as 
holding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not cover claims 
against individual foreign government officers. Instead of stopping at 
that rather unassailable conclusion, the Court took the more 
controversial step of holding that individual officers still could be entitled 
to immunity as a matter of federal common law. This Symposium Essay, 
part of a larger set of papers addressing Samantar, criticizes that 
conclusion. It criticizes the Court for failing to justify this exceptional 
exercise of its common-law-making power and identifies the pitfalls of this 
under-theorized conception of federal common law. Instead, this Essay 
argues, the Court should have refrained from exercising its power here. 
Such an approach would have had the salutary effect of forcing Congress 
to fill an obvious gap and, thereby, perhaps bring United States law more 
into harmony with the prevailing international norms on the subject. 
Finally, the Essay anticipates potential criticisms to this approach and 
explains how other doctrines can address those criticisms.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 590 
II.  FOUR ERAS OF IMMUNITY ........................................................ 591 
III.  FOUR PUZZLES ............................................................................ 597 
A. What’s the authority for the federal common law? ........................ 597 
B. What’s the scope of the common-law immunity for foreign 
officials? ................................................................................... 599 
C. When is a suit against an individual government official the 
functional equivalent of a suit against a foreign state? ................ 601 
D. What’s the role of the executive branch? ....................................... 605 
IV.  WHAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DONE............................ 606 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. During the 
2010–2011 academic year, Professor Rutledge was a Visiting Professor and Fulbright 
Scholar at the Institut für Zivilverfahrensrecht, University of Vienna Law School 
(Austria). Thanks to Dean Rebecca White for her financial support of this research 
and to the University of Vienna Law School for providing an office and other support 
during my year in residence there. Thanks to Bill Dodge and Beth Stephens for their 
comments on a draft of this article and to Ingrid Wuerth for many stimulating 
conversations on the topic of official immunity. Finally, thanks to Amanda Holcomb 
for excellent research assistance. 
Do Not Delete 8/11/2011  5:43 PM 
590 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:3 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Samantar v. Yousuf, the Supreme Court addressed a long-
simmering dispute over whether the protections of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (“FSIA”) extended to individual government officers.1 All 
nine justices agreed that it generally did not, though the Court’s opinion 
left open the possibility that certain suits against foreign officials could be 
the functional equivalent of a suit against the state and, thereby, qualify 
for the FSIA’s protections. Otherwise, foreign government officials are, at 
most, entitled to an official immunity at federal common law, the precise 
contours of which the Court left unaddressed. 
While the Court at least can be praised for wading into this 
increasingly important area, its decision is remarkably unsatisfying. The 
decision fails to articulate a coherent theoretical foundation, fails to 
provide sufficient guidance about the scope of this federal common law 
of immunity, and fails to trace through the implications of its holding. 
The unfortunate result will be at least several years of litigation as lower 
courts (and litigants) struggle to make sense of the Court’s decision. 
This result is especially troubling for two reasons. First, it concerns 
(at least partly) a jurisdictional rule; such rules should be clear to both 
the parties and the courts. Second, suits against foreign government 
officials easily can touch upon the foreign relations of the United States, 
and the lack of clear standards about when those suits can go forward 
threatens to frustrate the management of those relations. 
Instead of adopting this half-baked solution, the Court should have 
opted for a more radical approach: it should have held that the FSIA did 
not cover foreign government officials and that federal common law did not 
fill in the gap. While this result might have had the short-term 
consequence of leaving some government officials exposed to suit, it 
would have had the salutary effect of a forcing rule. It would have 
encouraged the political branches either to amend the FSIA or to 
formulate a new legislative structure to govern the immunity of foreign 
government officials. The result would have provided a sounder 
architecture for these suits and, contrary to an expected criticism, would 
not have raised insurmountable concerns about the rule’s effect on 
pending or future cases.  
This Essay develops this thesis in three parts. The first part provides a 
general overview on sovereign immunity law with a special emphasis on 
official immunity. The second elaborates upon the flaws in Samantar and 
defends the proposition that the Court should not have allowed vague 
notions of federal common law to fill the apparent gap in the federal law 
governing sovereign immunity. The third charts an alternative course 
that the Court could have followed and anticipates criticisms. 
1 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010). 
Do Not Delete 8/11/2011  5:43 PM 
2011] OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW 591 
 
II. FOUR ERAS OF IMMUNITY 
A bit of background helps to place Samantar in context. For nearly 
the first century and a half of the nation’s history, United States courts 
followed an absolute theory of sovereign immunity.2 Under that theory, 
foreign sovereigns were not answerable for their conduct in another 
country’s domestic courts.3 This approach comported with other post-
Westphalian doctrines such as those governing judicial jurisdiction (i.e., 
personal jurisdiction) and legislative jurisdiction (i.e., the 
extraterritoriality of federal statutes) that gave primacy to the power of 
nation-states.4 It effectively blocked any suits against individual foreign 
government officials as well. As extensions of the state, these officials 
enjoy the state’s absolute immunity, and little reported case law addresses 
the precise issue during this period.5 
While courts linked the immunity of the foreign state with the 
immunity of foreign state officials, that linkage was not strictly necessary. 
Domestic sovereign immunity doctrines provide an interesting 
counterpoint. There, by contrast, the Court showed a willingness in the 
nineteenth century already to extend state officials a narrower immunity 
than that extended to the state at least where, under agency principles, 
the state actor could be said to be acting ultra vires or beyond the scope of 
his authority.6 Yet this line of reasoning did not, as far as I can tell, 
penetrate the more formalistic doctrines governing foreign sovereign 
immunity.7 
By the early twentieth century, however, the absolute approach to 
sovereign immunity began to erode, and the jurisprudence entered a 
second era. In cases like Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. 
The Navemar, the Court displayed a greater willingness to entertain suits 
against the foreign sovereign.8 The critical determinant, however, was the 
position of the executive branch. In cases where the executive branch 
filed a suggestion of immunity, the Court consistently acceded to that 
2 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 220 (4th ed. 2007). 
3 See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 
(1812). 
4 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 78–80, 615–17. 
5 See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); Jones v. Le Tombe, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 384, 385 (1798); Actions Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 81, 81 
(1797); Suits Against Foreigners, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 45, 46 (1794). 
6 See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887). 
7 The petitioner in Samantar later advanced a form of this argument. Brief of 
Appellants at 32 & n.19, Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-
1893). 
8 See 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938). 
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suggestion.9 In cases where they did not, the Court was more likely to 
exercise jurisdiction.10 
Two features marked this second era of sovereign immunity. First, 
the source of the immunity shifted from a doctrine grounded in 
principles of international law or constitutional law to one grounded in 
principles of comity.11 While comity is an elusive concept subject to many 
meanings, in this context it can be understood as an effort to ensuring 
harmonious relations among nation-states.12 Second, and relatedly, this 
era represented perhaps the high-water mark of deference to the views of 
the executive branch. In other words, the court rested its immunity 
decisions not simply on its own conception of “comity” (as it did, for 
example, in the judgment-enforcement context).13 Instead, it allowed the 
executive branch to serve as the institution defining the effect of a lawsuit 
on comity and, essentially, deferred to its determination. 
If immunity is viewed in light of comity, the role of the executive 
branch makes some sense. When the executive branch indicates that a 
case implicates an immunity, it simultaneously is signaling the 
importance of the case to the foreign relations of the United States. 
Conversely, when the executive branch declines to file a suggestion of 
immunity, that inaction likewise signals to the Court that entertaining 
jurisdiction is unlikely to have much impact on foreign relations. 
By the middle of the twentieth century, the United States arguably 
entered a third era of sovereign immunity law (though it might also be 
seen as simply an extension of the second). The seminal event in this era 
was the release of the famous Tate Letter.14 Penned by the State 
Department’s legal advisor, that letter embraced what had come to be 
9 See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945); Ex parte 
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587–89 (1943). 
10 The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 75. 
11 There is a competing view here. Under the competing view, both the first and 
second eras were rooted in comity, with the Court treating comity in the first era as a 
type of derogable customary international law. The only difference was the treatment 
of the executive branch’s position. For a thoughtful articulation of this view, see 
William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International Law: Some Lessons from 
History, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 169, 188–89 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
2010/12/17/dodge.html. While I agree with Professor Dodge on the latter point (the 
evolution in the role of the executive branch), I think his treatment of Schooner 
Exchange, while certainly plausible, does not quite capture its relationship to other 
doctrines (mentioned in the text) which anchored customary international law in 
something more than comity. 
12 See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International 
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11 (2010); William S. Dodge, 
International Comity in American Courts (ASIL Int’l Econ. Law Interest Grp. 2009), 
available at http://www.asil.org/files/dodge.pdf. 
13 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227–28 (1895).  
14 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser of the Dep’t of State, to Philip 
B. Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T. ST. BULL. 984, 984–85 
(1952). 
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known as the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.15 Under that 
theory, the sovereign remained absolutely immune from suit for acts 
taken in its sovereign capacity. It surrendered that immunity, however, 
when it acted in a non-sovereign (most notably a commercial) capacity. 
In theory, this evolution held forth the promise of standardizing the 
immunity determination. That is, the sovereign/non-sovereign line 
offered the possibility that the immunity determination might turn on a 
legal standard rather than a political calculus. In practice, however, the 
executive branch continued to control the immunity determination. It 
did so by deciding whether to classify a particular act as sovereign or non-
sovereign.16 As with the prior era, courts largely deferred to this 
determination. The labels had changed, but the basic allocation of power 
among government institutions had not.  
This era also introduced a meaningful distinction between suits 
against a foreign state and suits against foreign state officials. An 
exhaustive survey of precedents during this era identifies several cases 
where the executive branch opined on the immunity of individual 
foreign government officials from suit.17 
While the executive branch enjoyed great power during this era (and 
the preceding one), this power was not altogether welcome. For while 
the executive branch could use its power over the immunity suggestion 
(or sovereign/non-sovereign classification) as a source of diplomatic 
leverage, this authority also subjected the executive branch to regular 
pressure from foreign states and their patrons to adopt a favorable 
position when the state was subject to litigation.18 Such overtures were 
not always welcome, particularly where the political dynamics of the suit 
were complex (such as in a case where a major United States company 
was suing the foreign sovereign). In such cases, the executive branch was 
put in the dilemma of supporting the foreign state (and risk 
undermining the interests of an important domestic entity) or not 
intervening (and risk riling relations with an ally).19 Unsurprisingly, 
15 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 221. 
16 Id. at 221–22. 
17 See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State: May 1952 to 
January 1977, in 1977 DIGEST app., at 1020. 
18 See Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315 
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 34–35.(1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Dep’t 
of State).  
19 Similar issues have arisen more recently in the context of statements of interest 
in litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. In this regard, recent comments of John 
Bellinger, former Legal Advisor to the executive branch, are especially apt: “[C]ase-
by-case participation can put the Executive Branch in a difficult spot . . . . Foreign 
governments will continue to press U.S. administrations to weigh in on their behalf in 
ATS litigation. If the Executive is expected to weigh in when litigation presents 
foreign policy concerns, courts may come to infer (wrongly) from its silence in other 
cases that there are no such concerns. In addition, foreign governments may come to 
regard the Executive’s decisions whether or not to file as a reflection of the United 
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therefore, the executive branch’s litigation position during this era was 
riddled with inconsistencies that were difficult to 20
Against this background, the FSIA ushered in the fourth era of 
sovereign immunity law in 1976.21 The stated purpose of the FSIA was to 
de-politicize immunity determinations and to inject a predictability and 
consistency into the issue.22 The law did so by setting forth a general 
grant of immunity.23 It then subjected that general grant to a series of 
exceptions such as waiver, commercial activity, and non-commercial 
tort.24 This new scheme largely reallocated power over the immunity 
determination from the executive branch to Congress and the courts. 
Congress initially controlled the scope of the immunity through its 
definition of the entities entitled to it and the scope of the exceptions. 
The courts secondarily controlled the scope of the immunity through 
decisions that filled the statute’s interstices. 
Critical for purposes of this Essay, the statute defined the range of 
entities entitled to the FISA’s protections. Technically, the immunity 
extended to “foreign state[s].”25 This term was, however, further defined 
to encompass three broad categories—the foreign state proper, political 
subdivisions of the foreign state, and agencies or instrumentalities of the 
foreign state.26 While the first two categories were relatively 
straightforward in most cases,27 agency or instrumentality required 
further definition. It included “organ[s]” of the state (a term not 
States’ view of its bilateral relationship with that government. Domestically, foreign 
policy submissions will often be read as partisan support for the activities of foreign 
governments over the deserving interests of the plaintiff victims.” John B. Bellinger 
III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other 
Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 11 (2009).  
20 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2004); Verlinden 
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human Rights 
Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2d 9, 19 (2009). 
21 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
22 See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2006). 
23 Id. § 1604. 
24 Id. § 1605. 
25 Id. § 1604. 
26 Id. § 1603. 
27 One nested ambiguity in the statute was how to identify whether a defendant 
satisfied the definition of a foreign state proper. Jurisprudence following the FSIA’s 
enactment has followed one of two main roads. Most courts have analyzed the 
question based on whether the executive branch has recognized the state (a residual 
area in which the executive branch’s views on the immunity determination can be 
effectively dispositive). A second approach has been to apply a more legalistic 
definition to the concept of the state, borrowing from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987). See BORN & RUTLEDGE, 
supra note 2, at 239. 
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otherwise defined in the statute) and corporate or other similar entities 
that were majority-owned by the state.28 
Yet the statute contained a gaping hole—it did not address the 
extent to which individual foreign government officials enjoyed 
immunity.29 This lacuna created a classic interpretive dilemma for lower 
courts. If they concluded that the FSIA simply did not cover government 
officials (and thus they enjoyed no special immunity from suit in the 
United States), then creative plaintiffs could perform an end-run around 
the FSIA simply by suing the government official rather than the 
sovereign itself. On the other hand, if they concluded that individual 
foreign government officials continued to enjoy immunity from suit, that 
conclusion created some tension with the FSIA’s overall purpose of 
depoliticizing questions of foreign sovereign immunity through a 
comprehensive federal statute that set forth predictable standards 
applicable in both federal and state courts. 
Given this interpretive dilemma, federal courts unsurprisingly 
reached conflicting conclusions.30 Some courts concluded that, 
notwithstanding the awkward textual fit, the FSIA continued to cover 
individual government officers.31 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank was an early important decision 
exemplifying this approach.32 By contrast, other courts concluded that 
the FSIA did not cover foreign government officials, but that such 
officials continued to enjoy the common-law immunity that predated the 
FSIA’s enactment. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Enahoro v. Abubakar 
supplied the most thorough articulation of this position.33  
A third position was available to courts—namely that, following the 
FSIA’s enactment, individual government officials no longer enjoyed any 
immunity from suit. Such an approach would have avoided the dilemmas 
confronted by the two preceding approaches. It avoids any tension with 
the FSIA’s language (and may well have prompted Congress to adopt a 
legislative fix). It also avoids any ambiguity about the legitimacy and 
scope of a federal common-law immunity. Yet, except in rare cases 
involving United States citizens who claimed to have been acting on 
28 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003).  
29 The reasons for this lacuna are unclear. Some sources suggest that Congress 
simply did not consider the matter while others suggest that Congress intentionally 
meant to exclude it. See Chimène I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley 
and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 6–7 (2010), http://www.yjil.org/docs/ 
pub/o-36-keitner-officially-immune.pdf. 
30 Beth Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2680 (2011).  
31 Some academic scholarship supported this view. See Bradley & Goldsmith, 
supra note 20, at 9–10. For criticism, see Keitner, supra note 29, at 6–7. 
32 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990). 
33 408 F.3d 877, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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behalf of foreign sovereign entities,34 no reported decisions appear to 
have followed this path. 
By the time the petitioners in Samantar sought certiorari, the 
doctrine was in disarray. Two circuits had held that the FSIA did not 
cover foreign government officials, while at least five others (arguably) 
held that it did.35 
Samantar offered a good vehicle in which to resolve this conflict. The 
original case involved a suit by natives of Somalia who alleged that 
Samantar, the former Prime Minister, First Vice President and Minister 
of Defense, had authorized extrajudicial killings and torture of the 
plaintiffs or their family members during the 1980s.36 During that time, 
the United States formally recognized the military regime, of which 
Samantar was a part, as the lawful government of Somalia.37 Following 
the fall of the military regime, Samantar fled the country in 1991 and 
eventually became a resident of Virginia.38 Thus, by the time plaintiffs 
commenced their suit, Samantar was a former high-government official 
of a foreign state. 
The district court, relying on a prior circuit precedent, held that the 
FSIA covered Samantar, at least insofar as he was acting within the scope 
of his authority, and (concluding that he was) further held that none of 
FSIA’s exceptions applied.39 Consequently, the district court concluded 
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.40 The Fourth Circuit reversed.41 
It held that the FSIA did not apply to individual government officers but 
remanded the case to the district court to decide whether a common-law 
immunity protected Samantar.42  
Affirming the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, the Supreme Court held 
that the FSIA generally does not cover individual government officers.43 
That conclusion, the Court rightly recognized, flowed from the FSIA’s 
text and structure which simply did not contemplate individual 
defendants within its design.44 While holding that (most) suits against 
34 See, e.g., In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 963 (7th Cir. 1996); Rimsat, Ltd. v. 
Hilliard (In re Rimsat, Ltd.), 207 B.R. 964, 968 (D.D.C. 1997); Jugobanka d.d. N.Y. 
Agency v. Unis Int’l Corp., No. 93 C 1865, 1995 WL 3987, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 
1995).  
35 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 n.4 (2010) (summarizing split). 
36 Id. at 2282. 
37 See id. at 2283; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Affirmance at 4, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter Brief for the 
United States]. 
38 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283.  
39 Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *8–14 (E.D. Va. Aug. 
1, 2007). 
40 Id. at *15. 
41 Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 2009). 
42 Id. at 383–84. 
43 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283 n.3, 2289. 
44 Id. at 2286–89.  
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foreign government officials fell outside the FSIA, the Court did not 
hang them out to dry. Instead, aligning itself with the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Enahoro, the Court held that such officials might enjoy a 
common-law immunity.45 Unfortunately, the Court provided virtually no 
guidance on the scope of that immunity, instead remanding the case so 
that the district court, in the first instance, could decide whether 
Samantar was entitled to immunity under that (unspecified) standard.46 
III. FOUR PUZZLES 
While Samantar deserves some nominal praise for resolving the 
immediate circuit split, the decision is deeply unsatisfying. The 
theoretical underpinnings of this exercise of federal common-law power 
are woefully underdeveloped. Moreover, even assuming that the Court 
properly exercised its common-law power in this setting, the decision 
leaves unanswered a host of questions about the scope of individual 
immunity and the relationship between that immunity and the FSIA’s 
framework. Finally, the decision renews (but does not resolve) the old 
wars over the proper branch of government to control the immunity 
determination. In these respects, Samantar may well have unleashed more 
doctrinal problems than it resolved. 
A. What’s the authority for the federal common law?  
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Court’s opinion is its 
unexamined assumption that its power to articulate federal common law 
extends to the doctrine of the immunity of foreign government officials. 
In recent years, the Court’s power to assert federal common law has been 
a hotly debated issue, including in matters of international civil 
litigation.47 Yet in Samantar all nine justices accepted the proposition that 
the Court’s post-Erie power to articulate federal common law extends to a 
field that abuts one where Congress has spoken.48 
The Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain vividly illustrates the 
need to articulate clearly the source and basis of the federal common-law 
power. Sosa concerned the Alien Tort Statute, which authorizes federal 
court jurisdiction over suits brought by aliens alleging torts committed in 
45 Id. at 2292–93. 
46 Id. at 2293. 
47 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004). See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 11–13.  
48 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. Of course, the fault here may not simply lie with 
the Samantar Court but, instead, the earlier post-Erie decisions of Ex parte Republic of 
Peru and Hoffman which asserted the power to make federal common law in this area. 
For a thoughtful argument that those decisions were wrong as an original matter, see 
Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against 
the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 928 (2011). Special thanks to Bill Dodge for 
pushing me on this argument. 
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violation of the law of nations.49 In Sosa, the Court held that this grant of 
subject-matter jurisdiction encompassed a limited number of historically 
rooted causes of action (like violations of safe passage by ambassadors) 
and also contemplated a limited number of new torts created as a matter 
of federal common law so long as the norm, defined at a high level of 
specificity, had achieved a degree of acceptance among civilized nations 
comparable to the acceptance of the historically rooted actions 
recognized at the time of the ATS’s enactment in the late eighteenth 
century.50 The Sosa majority thought this approach, coupled with various 
prudential devices, would apply a meaningful check on ATS litigation.51 
Yet it had precisely the opposite effect. This opaque standard instantly 
invited widespread academic criticism and spawned significant confusion 
among lower courts about when a norm satisfied the Sosa standard.52 
Tellingly, even though the Court in Sosa claimed that the standard set a 
high bar and, thus, should limit the number of suits, it appears that, in 
certain sectors, more ATS suits were filed after Sosa than prior to that 
decision (during the two decades where the ATS’s scope was completely 
unaddressed by the Court and parties fought on an open terrain).53 Sosa 
thus demonstrates the perils of announcing a vague federal common-law 
standard in a Supreme Court opinion and leaving the lower courts (and 
litigants) to sort out the messy details. Compared to the rule announced 
in Samantar, the rule in Sosa is a model of clarity. 
49 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. The Alien Tort Statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
(2006). 
50 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.  
51 Id. at 725–31; see also id. at 739–51 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
52 See, e.g., BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 33; Eugene Kontorovich, 
Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien 
Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004). Indeed, even in the one instance 
where Congress spoke clearly in this area—namely the Torture Victim Protection 
Act—courts cannot agree over whether the TVPA states the exclusive remedy for 
torture claims or, instead, such claims are also actionable under Sosa as a matter of 
federal common law. Compare, e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that the TVPA “occup[ied] the field” for torture claims), and 
Mohamad v. Rajoub, 664 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Surely, caution in 
developing a cause of action under federal common law is appropriate in situations 
such as this where Congress has already established a cause of action and explicitly 
defined its scope in the TVPA.”), with Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 
1154 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the TVPA merely extended to United States 
citizens the right to bring torture claims, a right unavailable to them under the ATS), 
and Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 686 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that 
the TVPA does not preclude torture claims under federal common law against non-
natural persons). See generally Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085–
86 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (collecting cases). 
53 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 
2424 (2008) (No. 07-919) (mem.), aff’g Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 
F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). In the interest of disclosure, I should note that 
I filed this brief on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce.  
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Of course, one might distinguish between a federal common-law-
making power to create a cause of action and a federal common-law-
making power to generate an affirmative defense (like immunity). 
Leaving the latter a bit vague is less problematic, so the argument goes, 
because there is less harm in judicial overextension of a liability-limiting 
(as opposed to liability-creating) rule of federal common law. This 
argument assumes, of course, that federal courts will use their common-
law power generously (risking overextensions of the immunity) rather 
than sparingly (risking insufficient immunity). Moreover, the 
defensibility of that distinction depends critically on the value 
underpinning one’s view of federal common-law power. If the underlying 
value is comity, then perhaps the distinction makes sense. But if the 
underlying value is separation of powers (or simply a more modest view 
of judicial lawmaking power), then the two are not so easily 
distinguished. Vague and unprincipled assertions of the power to make 
federal common law, whether liability-creating or liability-limiting, 
trample upon the power of the legislative branch to regulate a matter (or 
leave it unregulated). 
B. What’s the scope of the common-law immunity for foreign officials?  
The ultimate section of Samantar can be read to support the notion 
that this common-law immunity survives the FSIA.54 Exactly how that 
immunity operates is something that Samantar leaves remarkably 
unclear.55 Footnote 17 of the Court’s opinion could be read to suggest an 
“official capacity” or “scope of authority” test, but then the Court 
explicitly backs away from endorsing that (or any other) test.56 Several 
academic commentators have sought to address this issue, but none of 
those accounts are satisfactory. 
Under one account, the Court’s lack of clarification on this point 
may be defended on the ground that it was entirely appropriate for the 
Court to leave such issues to lower courts to work out in the first 
instance.57 It is true that the Court routinely makes this move in its 
opinions, but this was not the sort of issue warranting such a punt. For 
one thing, this was not some novel theory cooked up by a creative 
Supreme Court advocate that had never been tested below. Instead, the 
issue had been raised below and had been an established theory among 
the lower courts for how to resolve issues of individual immunity. For 
another thing, the issue did not involve an application of law to fact but, 
54 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2292–93 (2010). 
55 See Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN 
BAG 2D 61, 68 (2010) (“The central challenge for the district court in Samantar on 
remand, and for courts in other cases, will be to determine which acts are entitled to 
immunity, and which acts are not.”). 
56 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291 n.17. 
57 I thank Ed Swaine for his thoughtful reactions to my post on Opinio Juris on 
this point. 
Do Not Delete 8/11/2011  5:43 PM 
600 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:3 
 
instead, a pure question of law, which the Supreme Court is as equipped 
to address as a lower federal court. (On this score, it might have been 
justifiable for the court to remand the case for further factual 
development on whether Samantar satisfied whatever test the Court 
articulated,58 a different result than remanding so the lower courts could 
try to divine the proper test from the entrails in the Court’s opinion.) 
Furthermore, this particular question of law would have justified more 
clarity from the Court. As the Court has noted elsewhere, immunity 
defenses protect officials not simply from liability but from the burdens 
of suit.59 By remanding the case for further articulation (and likely 
appeal) on the proper test, Samantar will be forced to endure several 
rounds of litigation even if he ultimately prevails. Finally, as a prudential 
matter, the Court could have afforded to do more. Its view on the central 
immunity question was unanimous (with the justices disagreeing only on 
the validity of resorting to legislative history),60 so surely the Court might 
have attempted to reach some consensus on the proper standard even if, 
in doing so, it risked splitting off a couple of justices who took a different 
view about the proper test. 
Under another account, the Court’s opinion either should be read 
to endorse the pre-FSIA “official immunity” test or, alternatively, courts 
should adopt this test on remand as a matter of federal common law.61 
That view suffers from several flaws.62 For one thing, the principle that 
acts of Congress will not be lightly read to derogate from the common 
law presupposes the existence of a well-established common-law 
principle. As even the Solicitor General’s brief itself acknowledges, 
virtually no cases addressed the issue of official immunity as of the time 
58 As it did, for example, in Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 
(1999). 
59 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–15 (1982). 
60 See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2293 (Alito, J., concurring), 2293 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), 2293–94 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
61 The Seventh Circuit implicitly proposed this approach in the Abubakar 
litigation. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2005). 
62 The limited experience following Samantar does not make one sanguine about 
the prospects for a clear test. Following remand of the case, the Justice Department 
filed a statement of interest sharing the State Department’s views that Samantar was 
not entitled to official immunity. See Statement of Interest of the United States of 
America at 7, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV 1360 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011) 
[hereinafter Statement of Interest]. Rather than anchoring this view in Samantar’s 
conduct, the State Department rested on two obscure facts—(a) the lack of a formally 
recognized government in Somalia and (b) Samantar’s current residence in the 
United States. Moreover, the brief went to great pains to explain how its view was 
informed by customary international law and how the factors articulated by the State 
Department were not exhaustive. As I have explained elsewhere in greater detail, this 
vague position hardly provides predictability in this area and does not represent the 
sort of principled litigating position that, under normal principles of administrative 
law, would be entitled to much deference. See Peter B. Rutledge, Samantar and 
Executive Power, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2011). 
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of the FSIA’s enactment.63 So the idea that Congress implicitly intended 
to leave this area of law alone is dubious at best. For another thing, this 
standard simply begs the point about how one describes the scope of 
authority. Suppose that a covert agent assassinates a foreign official; 
suppose that a government official refuses to issue a title to a real estate 
transfer (which it’s his job to do) because he’s been bribed. Do these acts 
fall within the scope of the officials’ authority? Even if courts can coalesce 
around a test, what law governs the question? Federal common law, one 
might naturally say. But not so fast. How can that approach be squared 
with the scope-of-employment prong under the non-commercial tort 
exception? Lower courts disagree over what conflicts principles (federal 
or state) and what substantive principles (federal, state, or international) 
govern these questions.64 Consequently, Samantar creates an odd 
situation where different sources of law inform the same inquiry, 
depending solely on the identity of the defendant (which could produce 
particularly confusing results when both the foreign state and the 
individual officer are defendants). 
C. When is a suit against an individual government official the functional 
equivalent of a suit against a foreign state?  
As noted above, the Court fudged on part of its opinion in Samantar. 
While holding that the FSIA generally does not cover suits against 
individual officers, the Court acknowledged that some suits against 
individual officers are indistinguishable from suits against the foreign 
state itself. 65 In those circumstances, the FSIA applies. 
Yet the Court offers virtually no guidance on when such a state of 
affairs arises. One can tease only three hints from its opinion. First, the 
Court implicitly holds that the instant suit against Samantar does not fall 
within this category.66 But whether that is because Samantar is a former 
official or because of some other feature of the case, the Court leaves 
unclear. Second, the Court acknowledges the test from section 66 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States—where a 
judgment against the foreign official “would be to enforce a rule of law 
against the state.”67 Yet while acknowledging the test, the Court explicitly 
63 See Brief for the United States, supra note 37, at 9–12, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 
S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555). This sets official immunity apart from other 
immunities like diplomatic immunity that enjoy a much richer history. See BORN & 
RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 242, 255–57. Moreover, though commentators regularly 
overlook this fact, diplomatic immunity is formally domesticated in the United States 
by statute, namely the Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254d (2006).  
64 Compare Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of China, 923 F.2d 957, 959–
61 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying state choice-of-law principles under FSIA), with Liu v. 
Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1425–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying federal choice-
of-law principles under FSIA). See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 242, 255–57. 
65 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. 
66 Id. at 2292. 
67 Id. at 2290 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
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refuses to endorse it.68 Third, the Court alludes to its decision in 
Philippines v. Pimentel,69 suggesting that the linkage between official 
immunity and foreign-state immunity concerns whether the state would 
be an indispensable party.70 But that decision involves a rather unique set 
of events where the state and private plaintiffs had competing claims 
against a pool of assets seized from the former Philippine dictator—not 
the typical stuff of which suits against foreign states or foreign officials 
are made.71 In short, nothing in the Court’s opinion sheds much light on 
identifying whether the suit against the government official qualifies as 
the functional equivalent of a suit against the state. 
The Court’s lack of guidance is especially troubling, given the 
significance of the decision. For one thing, the answer to this question 
determines whether the FSIA’s above-described entitlements apply in the 
case. Of particular importance are the special rights of judicial access. 
For example, a foreign state has a right to remove the case from state to 
federal court; similarly, a foreign state has an immediate right of appeal 
from an order denying a claim of immunity.72 If a suit against a foreign 
government official does not qualify as the functional equivalent of a suit 
against the state, then these rights presumably drop out (unless the 
undeveloped federal common law of official immunity also contains these 
entitlements too—a result that not only would amount to a massive 
expansion of federal common law but would make the whole issue in 
Samantar a somewhat academic exercise).73 
Samantar suggests that the FSIA’s special entitlements do not apply 
to suits against foreign officials that do not qualify as the functional 
equivalent of a suit against the state. In a seeming nod to government 
defendants, the Court explains that the FSIA’s provisions on personal 
jurisdiction and service of process do not apply in these cases.74 This, 
according to the Court, should serve as a brake on suits against foreign 
government officials.75 Jurisdiction rules may supply more of a brake 
depending on what happens when the Court finally confronts whether 
UNITED STATES § 66 (1965)). 
68 Id. at 2290 n.15. 
69 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008). 
70 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. 
71 See Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. at 2286. Moreover, the argument presupposes that 
federal procedural law will govern the indispensable party analysis. As I note 
elsewhere, one particularly important consequence of Samantar is that it charts a path 
to keep a case against foreign government officials out of federal court. See infra notes 
82–83 and accompanying text. 
72 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2006); see, e.g., Eckert Int’l, Inc. v. Sovereign Democratic 
Republic of Fiji, 32 F.3d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1994). 
73 One recent appellate decision holds, with virtually no analysis, that denials of 
post-Samantar official immunity under federal common law are immediately 
appealable. See Ochoa Lizarbe v. Rivera Rondon, 402 F. App’x 834, at 837 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
74 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 n.20. 
75 Id. at 2292. 
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agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states are entitled to the 
protections of the Due Process Clause’s limits on the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.76 As to service of process, however, the Court gets it exactly 
backwards. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s view, serving process on a 
private foreign defendant is far easier than serving process on the foreign 
state. For one thing, service of process on foreign states is subject to rules 
of “strict compliance,” whereas service of process rules on “agencies or 
instrumentalities” (and other private defendants) is not as strict.77 For 
another thing, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) (which governs most 
instances of service of process on a foreign defendant) authorizes a 
variety of forms of service, and courts have been especially creative to use 
their powers under Rule 4(f)(3) to authorize a variety of creative 
methods of service (like email and facsimile) that never would suffice 
under the FSIA’s strict rules.78 Far from adding to the plaintiff’s burden 
when suing an individual government officer, the Court’s holding in 
Samantar lightens it. 
A host of other considerations follow from whether the suit against 
the foreign official is deemed to be the functional equivalent of a suit 
against the state. For example, under the FSIA, a state can be subject to 
suit if it waives the immunity.79 Where a suit against an individual official 
is the functional equivalent of a suit against the state, can the state as the 
de facto defendant waive the individual official’s immunity?80 What about 
former officials? Further, the answer to the “functional equivalent” 
question has important forum shopping implications. Prior to Samantar, 
the FSIA-based approach to individual immunity at least had the 
functional value of ensuring that a uniform immunity rule applied. One 
could avoid the risk of inconsistent results in federal and state court 
76 See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. of Azer., 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not prevent the U.S. from 
subjecting foreign states and instrumentalities to personal jurisdiction); Price v. 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding 
the same for foreign states only). If the Court embraces the Price–Frontera line, then 
it’ll be harder to establish personal jurisdiction over government officials than 
foreign states. But if the Court rejects Price–Frontera line, then there will be no greater 
protection of individuals than foreign states. Moreover, malleability of personal 
jurisdiction doctrines (particularly with imputation theories) means the contacts of 
individual officers may not be so important. 
77 See, e.g., Magness v. Russian Federation, 247 F.3d 609, 615–16 (5th Cir. 2001). 
See also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 896–902.  
78 See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 
2002). See also BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 823–25. 
79 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2006). 
80 The State Department has taken the view that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Samantar, the foreign state could waive the former official’s immunity. See 
Statement of Interest, supra note 62, at Ex. 1 (letter from Harold Koh, Legal Adviser 
for the Dep’t of State to Tony West, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div., Dep’t of Justice 
(Feb. 11, 2011)). Certainly nothing in the Court’s extremely narrow holding dictates 
that rule (obviously, as a formal matter, issues of waiver were not before the Court). 
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through the FSIA’s removal provision.81 After Samantar, the risk of forum 
shopping became rampant—to keep a case in state court, just file in a 
way to avoid section 1332 removal and structure the causes of action to 
avoid federal claims.82 Wouldn’t that be a pretty airtight way of keeping a 
case out of federal court despite the potentially profound impact of the 
case on foreign relations? The effect may be greater pressure to push 
more substantive federal common law into state court. This might ensure 
uniformity but at the expense of any theoretical coherence, and at the 
risk of undermining doctrines that balance the federal and state interests 
in the allocation of judicial and legislative jurisdiction.83 
Here, other doctrines may provide a solution to the dilemma created 
by the Court’s opinion. Two important doctrines—the act-of-state 
doctrine and the foreign-sovereign-compulsion doctrine—may provide 
the proper lens through which to view these issues.84 Both of those 
doctrines, like the standard set forth in section 66 of the Restatement 
(Second), concern the effect of decisions rendered by a United States 
court on a foreign sovereign. The doctrines apply even when the foreign 
sovereign is not a formal party to the case and, thus, provide an especially 
apt analogy to the sort of fact pattern that Samantar presents.85 Tying the 
two doctrines together and applying them in this context, one might 
construct a test under which the FSIA’s protections will apply where the 
suit might require a United States court to review the acts of a foreign 
state taken within its territory or, alternatively, require a foreign state to 
engage in some sort of conduct within its territory. For the logic of this 
analogy to work, the standards must be more relaxed than those 
necessary for either doctrine to apply (otherwise, the FSIA inquiry would 
81 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2006); Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 
480, 489 (1983).  
82 Assuming the case involves purely alien plaintiffs, then Article III would bar 
removal by the alien defendant. See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 
(1810). 
83 See, e.g., Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (comity-
of-nations doctrine). Lower courts are currently divided over the extent to which 
cases presenting foreign policy implications (whether grounded in comity or the act-
of-state doctrine) raise substantial questions of federal common law and, thereby, give 
rise to federal jurisdiction. Compare Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 
1376–78 (11th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that federal common law of foreign 
relations could give rise to federal jurisdiction), with Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque 
v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1088–90 (9th Cir. 2009) (act-of-state doctrine did 
not give rise to federal jurisdiction), and Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 
803 (9th Cir. 2001) (federal common law of foreign relations does not give rise to 
federal jurisidiction), and In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., 100 
F. Supp. 2d 31, 34–38 (D.D.C. 2000) (same). 
84 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (act-
of-state doctrine); Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. 
Supp. 1291, 1301–03 (D. Del. 1970) (foreign-sovereign-compulsion doctrine). See also 
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 751–812. 
85 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 751–812. 
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be moot because the doctrines would likely necessitate dismissal of the 
suit).86 
D. What’s the role of the executive branch?  
As noted earlier, prior to the FSIA’s enactment, the executive branch 
played a critical role in the immunity determination (albeit more 
frequently with foreign states than with their agencies or 
instrumentalities). To the extent Samantar holds that the pre-FSIA 
common-law immunity still covers individual officers after the FSIA’s 
enactment, does this framework also perpetuate the deference to the 
executive branch that predated the FSIA’s enactment? In a variety of 
recent contexts, the Court has indicated that the views of the executive 
branch are entitled to at least some weight.87 This simply continues a 
long-running debate in a variety of fields of international litigation about 
the role of the executive branch.88 How does this operate in the 
individual immunity context?89 
Under the Solicitor General’s view, the FSIA left untouched the 
third-era approach to official immunity under which the executive 
branch determined the immunity of foreign government officials.90 This 
view is problematic for at least two reasons. As noted above, it is far from 
clear that this common-law practice was so well established.91 Second, 
even if one accepts the premise that official immunity had achieved some 
sufficient degree of acceptance at the time of the FSIA’s enactment, it is 
constitutionally suspect, at best, to suppose that the content of this law 
depends on an executive determination (as opposed to judicial 
determination). While the law’s meaning (whether statutory or common 
law) might take into account the executive branch’s views (or even defer 
to them), no area of law to my knowledge depends on the executive 
branch’s interpretation to define its very content.92 
A more modest level of deference to the executive branch is 
defended by analogy to both diplomatic immunity and head-of-state 
86 This is the case unless, of course, one of the exceptions to the doctrine 
applied. See id. at 791–806.  
87 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004); Republic of Austria v. 
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004). 
88 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 18–20. 
89 I explore these issues at greater length in a forthcoming symposium piece for 
the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. See Rutledge, supra note 62. 
90 See Brief for the United States, supra note 37, at 8–13. Under a more modest 
version of this proposal, Chimène Keitner urges deference to status-based but not 
conduct-based immunities. See Keitner, supra note 55. 
91 See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text. 
92 Cf. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–
45 (1984). See also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (explaining the degree to which principles of Chevron 
deference may be properly extended to foreign relations law). 
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immunity.93 Closer examination, however, reveals that those analogies 
are especially inapt. Both of those doctrines involve a formal act of 
recognition—recognition of a diplomat or recognition of the legitimate 
head of state; such acts of recognition are understandably a 
quintessentially executive function (ones where the nation needs to 
speak with one voice) and, consequently, appropriate areas for deference 
to the executive branch.94 
Determination of a foreign government official’s entitlement to 
immunity stands on a very different footing. Such cases do not involve 
any act of recognition by the executive branch; instead, they simply 
involve matters about the formal organization of the foreign government 
(and perhaps relatedly whether the government official was acting within 
his or her scope of employment when engaging in the alleged act giving 
rise to the claim). As to such matters there is no particularly compelling 
need for the nation to speak with one voice, nor can the executive 
branch profess to have any particular expertise in the matter (compared, 
for example, with matters of diplomatic immunity). Thus, the case for 
deference to the executive branch as to the foreign official’s entitlement 
to immunity is especially weak. 
This is not to suggest, however, that the executive branch has no role 
to play in such suits. The executive branch still can play an important 
role by informing the Court about the effect of such a suit on the foreign 
relations of the United States. Thus, the executive branch certainly still 
can urge dismissal on the ground that considerations of comity, political 
question, or other grounds necessitate the Court to stay its hand.95 That 
function, however, concerns the general assessment of a case’s impact on 
the foreign relations of the United States and not the granular 
determination of whether a foreign government official qualifies for 
immunity under the common law. 
IV. WHAT THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DONE 
As the foregoing critique of Samantar suggests, the Court correctly 
held that the FSIA does not apply to individual officers but should not 
have invented an immunity doctrine in the exercise of its power to make 
federal common law. Instead, it should have held that individual 
government officials are not, presently, entitled to official immunity. 
Such a rule would have had three salutary consequences compared to the 
rule announced by the Court. For one thing, it would have provided 
clarity—litigants and courts would have immediately understood the 
rule’s effect on jurisdiction and a defendant’s rights. Second, the rule 
93 See Lewis S. Yelin, Head-of-State Immunity as Sole Executive Lawmaking, 45 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L (forthcoming 2011). 
94 The same is true of recognition of the state itself, part of the inquiry into a 
state’s immunity under the FSIA. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 2, at 236–42. 
95 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004). 
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would have avoided the theoretical confusion over the source of the 
Court’s power to make federal common law in this area. Third, the rule 
(not unlike an information-forcing default rule) undoubtedly would have 
forced the political branches to act and, thereby, take a more systematic 
approach to the entire issue, as it did with the FSIA, rather than have the 
doctrine develop incrementally, as Samantar anticipates.96 This forcing 
effect would have been especially valuable, as it might have induced 
Congress to take a fresh look at sovereign immunity law since the FSIA’s 
enactment, particularly in light of the recently drafted United Nations 
Convention on State Immunities and other efforts to achieve 
harmonization in this area.97 
This proposal undoubtedly will prompt objections, and I address two 
here. First, critics will claim that the rule leaves foreign government 
officials exposed to new lawsuits. Of course, this objection is valid only if 
one presupposes that the political branches would not respond to the 
forcing effects of such a decision. Yet the FSIA demonstrates Congress’s 
willingness to legislate in this area, and recent experience in other areas 
suggests that Congress is prepared to act swiftly when it disagrees with a 
non-constitutional decision of the Court.98 Moreover, as the Court itself 
in Samantar noted, personal jurisdiction rules would still serve as an 
effective constraint on suits against at least some foreign officials. 
Second, critics will argue that such a rule would throw existing 
litigation against foreign government officials into disarray. That 
objection, however, is exaggerated. In the short term, the Court could 
simply give prospective effect to its decision, as it has done in other 
96 Regarding this forcing effect of judicial decisions on the actions undertaken by 
coordinate branches of government, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory 
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162 (2002); Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in 
the Age of Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 679, 687–88 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New 
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1436 (1999); 
Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of 
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 568 (2005). 
97 See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and 
Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004). In this 
respect, defenders of Samantar have it wrong when they suggest that the decision was 
necessary in order not to cause the United States to violate its obligations under 
international law. But cf. Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283 n.3 (2010). 
Indeed, by forcing the political branches to address squarely the scope of a foreign 
government official’s immunity, it would have caused them to confront those 
obligations directly and address them in a systematic fashion that better assured 
compliance than the incremental, undeveloped approach taken by the Court. 
98 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), superseded in 
part by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v); 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5; EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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areas.99 Additionally, the executive branch could have intervened in 
politically sensitive cases against foreign government officials and urged 
their dismissal on prudential grounds. In the medium term, a legislative 
fix could address this issue as well. Just as the political branches have the 
authority to remove existing cases from federal court entirely,100 so too do 
they have the power to extend sovereign immunity to defendants in 
existing suits.101 
Ironically, in the same term that the Court decided Samantar, the 
Court unanimously resolved another case involving federal jurisdiction. 
There the Court wrote: 
Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time 
and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, 
but which court is the right court to decide those claims. 
Complex tests produce appeals and reversals, encourage 
gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results 
and settlements will reflect a claim’s legal and factual merits. 
Judicial resources too are at stake.102 
While the Court uttered those words in the context of the “principal 
place of business” determination in diversity suits, they equally apply in 
the context of jurisdictional determinations in cases against foreign 
governments or their officials. Indeed, given the potential foreign 
relations implications, the stakes are arguably far higher (and thus the 
need for clear, workable rules far greater). Yet the Court in Samantar did 
not heed its own advice and has bequeathed to lower courts (as well as 
litigants) a confused and murky test that hardly supplies the clarity that 
the Court described in Hertz as so essential. Unless the Court corrects its 
course (or Congress intervenes), this disappointing decision only will 
clutter the courts with distracting jurisdictional disputes for years to 
come. 
99 See generally Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of 
Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811 (2003) (discussing circumstances in 
which the Court has only given prospective effect to its decisions). 
100 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
101 See Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183, 2194 (2009) (“Laws that merely 
alter the rules of foreign sovereign immunity, rather than modify substantive rights, 
are not operating retroactively when applied to pending cases.”). 
102 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010) (citation omitted). 
